Abstract-A convertible multi-authenticated encryption (CMAE) scheme allows a group of signers to cooperatively produce a valid authenticated encryption signature and still preserves the characteristic of convertible authenticated encryption (CAE) schemes. In 2008, Tsai proposed a CMAE scheme based on the intractability of one-way hash functions and discrete logarithms. However, we find that Tsai's scheme cannot provide the semantic security of the message and the computational efficiency of this scheme is rather high. In this paper, we propose a secure CMAE scheme, in which it enhances the semantic security of the message to overcome the defect in Tsai's scheme. Moreover, by compared with Tsai's scheme, the performance of the proposed scheme is more efficient than Tsai's in term of computational complexity.
I. INTRODUCTION
Elaborating on the Nyberg-Rueppel message recovery signature scheme [1] , Horster et al., proposed an authenticated encryption (AE) scheme [2] . An AE scheme allows one signer to generate an authenticated ciphertext such that only a designated recipient has the ability to decrypt the signed message and verify its corresponding signature. That is to say, AE schemes achieve the security requirements of confidentiality, integrity, authenticity, and non-repudiation. So far, a number of AE schemes and variations have been proposed [3] - [16] .
In AE schemes, only a designated verifier is able to recover the signed message and then verify the validity of corresponding signatures. In case of a later dispute over repudiation, it is necessary to either reveal the verifier's private key or perform a zero-knowledge protocol for convincing any third party of the signer's dishonesty. In 1998, Araki et al. [5] proposed a convertible limited verifier signature scheme without revealing the designated verifier's private key or performing the zero-knowledge protocol. Their scheme can be recognized as a new type of AE scheme and called the convertible authenticated encryption (CAE) scheme.
In 2008, Wu et al., [9] elaborated on the merits of the CAE and the multisignature schemes to propose a convertible multi-authenticated encryption (CMAE) scheme for group-oriented applications based on the computational Diffie-Hellman problem (CDHP). Their scheme allows a group of signers to cooperatively produce a valid authenticated encryption signature and still preserves the characteristic of CAE schemes. The signed message is recovered from a given signature and the validity of the recovered message along with its corresponding signature can be verified by checking the message redundancy embedded in the message. That is, the security of Wu et al.'s scheme is primarily based on the adopted message redundancy generation algorithm. Recently, Tsai [10] proposed a new CMAE scheme with one-way hash function. His scheme outperforms Wu et al., one in terms of computational efficiency.
The security of Tsai's scheme is based on the one-way hash function and solving the discrete logarithm problem, which are believed infeasible to solve in polynomial time. However, we will show that the scheme cannot provide the semantic security of the message. In this paper, we gave a further improvement to provide the semantic security. Our improvement makes it more efficient in computation and communication.
II. REVIEW OF TSAI'S SCHEME The Tsai's scheme manipulated over GF (p), is comprised of three phases: 1) Signature encryption phase, 2) Message recovery and verification phase, and () Signature conversion phases. Before reviewing of the Tsai's scheme, all necessary parameters are described as follows: 
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Tsai's scheme is a distributed scheme and, hence, anyone in SG can act as the clerk to collect and verify all individual signatures, and combines them into 
Step 2: The recipient U v recovers the message M by computing
Step 3:
If Eq. (11) holds, the signature is accepted; otherwise it is refused.
C. Signature Conversion (SC) Phase
If dispute on repudiation, the recipient U v can release the 
Tsai's scheme cannot provide the semantic security of the message.
III. OUR IMPROVED SCHEME
Semantic security is of very importance to an authenticated encryption scheme for practical communications. Otherwise, if the possible messages are limited, then an adversary can eventually determine which message the signer signs by checking which satisfies the verification equalities. Tsai's scheme cannot provide the semantic security of the message. To provide the semantic security, the authors propose an improved scheme. Furthermore, our improvement is more efficient in term of computational efforts. Each phases of our improved scheme are described as follows.
A. Signature Encryption (SE) Phase
The system model and parameters are defined as those in Section II. For signing the message M, each SG U i ∈ performs the following steps:
Step 1: U i chooses a random number
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B. Message Recovery and Verification (MRV) Phase
from the clerk U k , the designated recipient U v can perform as following three steps:
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Step 3: The recipient U v verifies
(25)
If Eq. (25) holds, the signature is accepted; otherwise it is refused.
C. Signature Conversion (SC) Phase
If dispute on repudiation, the recipient U v can release the {S, K} for the message M. With this converted signature, anyone can validate its validity by Eq. (25).
IV. ANALYSIS OF THE IMPROVED SCHEME Security analysis and computational complexity analysis of our improved scheme are given below.
A. Security Analysis
The security of the proposed scheme is based on well-known cryptographic assumptions: solving the discrete logarithm problem (DLP) [17] and the intractability of reversing the one-way hash function (OWHF) [18] . In the following, we discuss some possible attacks against the proposed scheme and show that the proposed scheme is secure under the protection of the DLP and OWHF assumptions. 
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5) Can the attacker verify the signature before converted?
It requires the message M to perform the signature verification of Eq. (25). From the discussion (4), the attacker cannot obtain the message M before the signature is converted. Hence he cannot verify the signature.
B. Computational Complexity Analysis
We denote the following notations to facilitate the performance evaluation:
T MUL : time for performing a modular multiplication computation, T EXP : time for performing a modular exponentiation computation, T H : time for performing a one-way hash function computation, T INV : time for performing a modular inversion computation.
The time for performing the modular addition and the exclusive OR (XOR) operation are ignored, since they are relatively smaller than those for performing other operations. From [19] , [20] , the time complexities can be respectively regarded as T EXP ≈ 240 T MUL , T INV ≈ 10 T MUL , and T H ≈ 4 T MUL . The performance evaluations of the two schemes are described as Table I . Thus, we conclude that the proposed scheme is more efficient than Tsai's in term of computational complexity.
V. CONCLUSION
Semantic security is of very importance to an authenticated encryption scheme for practical communications. This article has shown that Tsai's scheme cannot provide the semantic security of the message. To provide the semantic security, the authors propose a secure CMAE scheme based on the intractability of one-way hash functions and discrete logarithms. Furthermore, our improvement is more efficient in term of computational complexity.
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